Shia Strength: [MahdiUniteMuslims] Somalia: The Battle for Mogadishu

Somalia: The Battle for Mogadishu – Round One
15 May 15, 2009 - 9:40:49 PM

Dr. Michael A. Weinstein

After more than a week of intense fighting between forces loyal to Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.) and its armed opposition in the country's capital Mogadishu, it has become abundantly clear that Somalia's southern and central regions are locked in the grip of a cycle of civil conflict that began in mid-winter.

In an accurate assessment of Somalia's political future (excluding the provisionally autonomous region of Puntland and the self-declared independent republic of Somaliland), posted on the Mareeg website on May 13, the author considers four scenarios that have become familiar in recent months: the T.F.G. defeats the armed opposition, the armed opposition defeats the T.F.G., the opposing forces reconcile, and the opposing forces enter a period of protracted fighting. The author concludes that the last projection is the most likely one "in the short- and medium-term."

Substantiation of the judgment that Somalia faces "protracted fighting without a definitive outcome" can be gained through an analytical chronicle of the events that occurred between mid-April and mid-May that describes how the positions of the major actors in the conflict have developed.

Phase 1 – Build-up

A deeper stage of civil conflict was signaled on April 13, when the T.F.G.'s minister of internal security, Col Omar Hashi Adan – an ally of the T.F.G.'s president, Sh. Sharif Sh. Ahmad, and the former commander of militias affiliated with the Islamic Courts Union (I.C.U.), which forms the backbone of Sh. Sharif's military support – addressed T.F.G. security forces and stated that "government troops are expected to wage war on the opposition who are still fighting in Mogadishu and other parts of the country and who have refused to accept the peace." Hashi added that the armed opposition was "working for the enemy" and "welcomes foreign fighters."

Hashi's call to arms, which followed a week of artillery duels between T.F.G./I.C.U. forces and the opposition, marked a decisive shift in the T.F.G.'s position, which had previously emphasized reconciliation with the opposition. His remarks provoked an immediate response from the Islamic Clerics Council (I.C.C.) and the Tradition and Unity Council (T.U.C.), which represents powerful Hawiye sub-clans in Mogadishu, both of which had been working in tandem to mediate between the T.F.G. and the opposition. I.C.C. chairman, Sh. Bashir Ahmed Salad warned that Hashi's rhetoric could disrupt the peace process; T.U.C. chairman, Mohamed Hassan Haad, called on Hashi to retract his statement and "apologize" to Mogadishu residents.

Refusing to heed the mediators' warnings, the T.F.G.'s interior minister, Sh. Abdikadir Ali Omar, another of Sh. Sharif's allies, urged the civilian population to "confront" those responsible for a string of assassinations and attempted assassinations of T.F.G. and I.C.U. officials. Hashi claimed that al-Shabaab, the most militant and uncompromising faction in the armed opposition, had sent 90 trained assassins to Mogadishu. On the ground, Abdullahi Isse Abtidon, a member of Sh. Sharif's parliamentary faction, and I.C.U. official Sharif Mohamud Hassan were gunned down. The latter incident triggered armed confrontation when I.C.U. forces moved against al-Shabaab positions.

Al-Shabaab spokesman, Sh. Mukhtar Robow denied that the group was involved in assassination; I.C.U. spokesman Abdirahim Isse Adow, claimed that al-Shabaab had phoned warnings to Abtidon and Hassan, adding that "this is the last chance" for the I.C.C. and T.U.C. to mediate. Dr. Omar Iman, the chair of the militant faction of Hizbul Islam (H.I.), the other major armed opposition group, urged the I.C.U. and al-Shabaab to "stop inciting war," to proceed with the mediation that H.I. was conducting, and to concentrate on attacking the African Union peacekeeping mission (AMISOM), which protects the T.F.G.

On April 18, intense fighting broke out between I.C.U. and al-Shabaab forces in southern Mogadishu. In the first such incident, a residence housing al-Shabaab officials was bombed. I.C.U. spokesman Adow said that his group had launched a crackdown on bandits and insurgents, and advised members of the transitional parliament to carry guns for their protection. On April 21, I.C.U. commander, Sh. Mohamed Mohamud Jimale, was gunned down and T.U.C. spokesman Ahmed Diriye Ali was attacked by gunmen. Diriye blamed al-Shabaab for the attack. On April 22, Haad denounced targeted assassinations and called on Mogadishu residents to form armed "civilian security forces." The I.C.C. echoed Haad's call and criticized the T.F.G. for failing to provide security. On the same day, the chairman of Mogadishu's Hodan district barely escaped a mine explosion targeting him.

Phase 2 – Wait-and-See

In the last week of April, Sh. Hassan Dahir Aweys, leader of the Asmara-based Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (A.R.S.-A), which forms the most significant component of the militant faction of H.I., returned to Mogadishu after a period of exile that followed the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in December 2006. The arrival of Sh. Aweys, who had shared power with Sh. Sharif during 2006, when the I.C.U. exerted dominant control over the southern and central regions, was greeted with speculation about his intent. On April 23, Iman's spokesman, Abubakar Sh. Usman Haji, said that Sh. Aweys was in Mogadishu to reconcile the conflicting Islamist factions. In an appearance on April 24, Sh. Aweys condemned the assassination of I.C.U. leaders and said that he would "meet with everyone concerned with Somalia."

Sh. Aweys' remarks were met by Sh. Sharif with the comment that his arrival showed that Mogadishu was safer than it previously had been. The T.F.G.'s justice minister, Sh. Abdirahman Janaqow, hailed Sh. Aweys' arrival and said that his presence would "help reconciliation."

On April 25, Sh. Aweys clarified his position, stating that he did not recognize the T.F.G., because it was "not a sovereign government and is commanded by foreign powers." Sh. Sharif's response was reported differently in various media. Garoweonline quoted him as saying that "we will speak with anyone who can change the situation in Somalia, but we will see if Sh. Aweys returned to wage war." The Mareeg website quoted Sh. Sharif as saying that "Sh. Hassan [Aweys] is a Somali patriot and I am ready to talk with him directly or indirectly, but he does not have the right to say the government is illegitimate." The BBC reported that Sh. Sharif said that he would talk with Sh. Aweys "and even accept him into the government" if that would help to stabilize Somalia.

As the dance between Sh. Aweys and Sh. Sharif proceeded, parliament was hit by a mortar attack, as was an AMISOM base manned by Burundian forces.

On April 26, Sh. Aweys' spokesman, Sh. Hasan Mahdi, told the Puntlandpost website that Sh. Aweys was planning to form a "parallel government" and would not recognize the T.F.G. Sh. Sharif commented that if Sh. Aweys wanted to engage in fighting, it would "be seen in the next few days." The IRIN news service reported that Sh. Aweys was working through local clans to initiate "informal talks" with the T.F.G. and had agreed to negotiate an accord. BBC correspondent Mohamed Mohamud reported that al-Shabaab had attended the rally welcoming Sh. Aweys to Mogadishu and that Sh. Aweys was talking to that group and H.I. Mohamud stated that the I.C.U. was on the verge of hostilities with the armed opposition and that, if serious conflict occurred, Mogadishu was likely to be divided into "fiefdoms," as it had been before the I.C.U.'s 2006 revolution against local warlords. Mohamud concluded: "From here, opposition and conflict look the most likely outcome." Sh. Sharif, on Egypt's Nile TV, warned that a "new cycle of violence" was looming, but did not commit to engaging in armed conflict. In an interview with the Financial Times, Sh. Sharif said that he was not speaking directly with Sh. Aweys, but that mediators were exploring the possibility of dialogue. Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke said that the T.F.G. had "plans to defeat violent groups."

On April 27, the head of al-Shabaab's finance department and one of its top commanders were shot down in Mogadishu in separate incidents.

On April 29, a closed source in East Africa reported that Sh. Aweys was under pressure from his Ayr sub-clan (Hawiye) to halt "non-strategic clashes" or leave Somalia. Sh. Sharif admitted that the T.F.G. did not "control most parts" of Somalia and that the opposition was determined "to continue fighting." He said that the T.F.G. would "embark on all steps that are at our disposal" to gain control, and that the opposition would either surrender or flee from Somalia. In a May 2 press conference, Sh. Sharif repeated his offer to negotiate with Sh. Aweys on power sharing, but added that the T.F.G. was training ten thousand security forces to control Mogadishu and the rest of Somalia. He condemned the armed opposition, but did not mention specific groups.

On May 3, Sh. Aweys finally resolved the doubts about his intentions. In an interview with Mogadishu's Radio HornAfrik, Sh. Aweys said that he would not meet with Sh. Sharif, whom he claimed was "more interested in pleasing the international community than in working for the Somali people." "I call on the various Islamist groups to fight our common enemy. … We are open only to talking with the international community," Sh. Aweys added. On May 4, the T.U.C. held its first meeting with Sh. Aweys and failed to reach an agreement with him.

Phase 3 – The Armed Opposition's Surge

The first round of the battle for Mogadishu began on May 4 when the militant faction of H.I. and al-Shabaab attacked the key base of H.I.'s pro-T.F.G. faction controlled by the latter's strongman, ex-warlord Yusuf Indha'ade, whom they accused of being in the pay of the T.F.G.

On May 6, Garoweonline reported that weapons destined for militant H.I. and al-Shabaab forces were flooding into Mogadishu and that H.I. was preparing for "all-out war." Al-Shabaab spokesman, Sh. Hassan Yakub declared that even if AMISOM withdrew from Somalia, his group would continue its jihad against the T.F.G. "until there is no obstacle to Islamic rule." On the ground, a member of AMISOM's Burundian contingent was gunned down.

On May 7, I.C.U. forces mounted an assassination attempt on an al-Shabaab official. Al-Shabaab forces rushed to the scene and a firefight ensued. Meanwhile, Sh. Sharif and Sharmarke held a meeting with the Indha'ade faction of H.I. at which the latter agreed to work with the T.F.G. on security and curbing assassinations. Militant H.I.'s leader Iman urged Islamist factions to halt armed conflict against one another.

On May 8, Indha'ade stated that "from this day onward, we will support and defend the government." He said that he had spoken with Sh. Aweys and that they had disagreed politically. Indha'ade's spokesman, Daud Mohamud Abtidon, announced that his faction was preparing to join the T.F.G. On the ground, fighting escalated when al-Shabaab and I.C.U. forces engaged in a major battle at Mogadishu's football stadium. The T.F.G.'s interior minister, Sh. Abdulkadir Ali Omar, stated that al-Shabaab had initiated the clash by attacking I.C.U. bases. The I.C.U. reportedly took up new positions in the north of Mogadishu. The I.C.C.'s chair, Sh. Bashir Ahmed Salad, said that Sh. Sharif had accepted the clerics' proposal for a ceasefire, but that the opposition had not replied.

Fighting continued on May 9, when I.C.U. forces attacked a police station held by the militant H.I. in north Mogadishu. The I.C.U. and al-Shabaab engaged in a firefight in the south of the city and two I.C.U. militiamen were gunned down in Bakara market. Al-Shabaab leader, Ali Muhammad Hussein, accused the I.C.C. of sheltering in districts controlled by the "enemies of the people" and said that the clerics would be "losers" if they failed to preach in areas under al-Shabaab's control. I.C.C. chair Salad denied al-Shabaab's accusation and said that his group had sent a committee to mediate between the government and opposition. Salad praised Iman's faction of H.I. for promoting a ceasefire.

On May 10, fighting spiked in the north and south of the city. Iman, claiming that the I.C.U. had attacked H.I. positions, abandoned his support for a ceasefire. Al-Shabaab joined forces with H.I. and al-Shabaab spokesman Sh. Ali Mohamed claimed that the armed opposition held all contested positions. The T.F.G.'s information minister, Farhan Mohamoud, denied Mohamed's assertions and said that the armed opposition was led by foreign fighters.

The gains of the armed opposition on May 10 marked a turning point in the first round of the battle for Mogadishu, spurring rapid repositioning and rebalancing of the contending forces. On May 11, the I.C.U. had abandoned its bases, forcing the T.F.G. back into the few areas protected by AMISOM tanks. Indha'ade surrendered his arms to Sh. Aweys, as did T.F.G. commander Muhammad Roble Gobale. Sh. Sharif ceded commanded of T.F.G. forces to the T.F.G.'s police chief, Abdi Qeybdid, an unpopular ex-warlord. Forces from the southern regions dominated by the armed opposition were reported to be reinforcing H.I. and al-Shabaab. Hashi said that the T.F.G.'s Council of Ministers had declared war on the armed opposition, but had not "closed the book" on reconciliation. Sh. Sharif held emergency meetings with AMISOM and the T.U.C. and I.C.C., urging the latter to issue a fatwa denouncing the armed opposition, a proposal that the Somaaljecel website reported the I.C.C. refused to accept. Sh. Sharif said that the opposition had refused to honor "initial agreements" with the T.F.G. and vowed to "defend the existence of the government." Waagacusub Media quoted a senior T.F.G. official as saying: "If the president and prime minister do not do something to deal with the insurgents, we will nearly all quit this government." Another source in East Africa reported on a tape of a T.F.G. National Security Council meeting recorded by al-Shabaab intelligence, in which former commander Gobale, who was conducting a briefing, complains that the T.F.G.'s security apparatus has been infiltrated by the armed opposition, lacks a unified command, and has been betrayed by Indha'ade. On the ground, fighting was reported around the presidential palace, Sh. Sharif's last redoubt. Repositioning continued on May 12, when the traditionalist Sufi group, Ahlu Sunna wal-Jamaa (A.S.W.J.), whose allied militias are dominant in the Galgadud region and have a presence in the southwest, and which had previously backed the T.F.G., announced that it would only join Sh. Sharif's forces on the condition that he would no longer "cooperate with foreign Islamic ideals," by which was meant not only the armed opposition, but also Sh. Sharif's own and predominantly Salafist clerical base. Reports surfaced in Somali media that al-Shabaab was planning an attack on the presidential palace.

On May 13, fighting resumed in northern and southern districts of Mogadishu, with the armed opposition gaining more territory. Al-Shabaab spokesman Sh. Mukhtar Abu Subeyr said that the T.F.G. could not be described as an Islamic government, despite its adoption of Shari'a law. Senior al-Shabaab official Hussein Ali Fidow acknowledged that non-Somalis were in his group's ranks, but refused to call them "foreign fighters," arguing that "only non-Muslims are foreigners."

Flying in the face of the facts on the ground, the international organizations supporting the T.F.G. and fronting for Western donor powers, attempted to downplay the gains of the armed opposition and the desperate plight of the T.F.G. The United Nations special representative for Somalia, Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, denounced the armed opposition, saying that Sh. Aweys had come to Mogadishu "to take power and topple a legitimate regime" by mounting a "coup attempt," and that al-Shabaab was "a ragtag alliance" with exclusively economic aims of protecting "often shady business interests." Admitting that the T.F.G. was "weak," Ould Abdallah quickly added that "to perpetuate the idea that it is a civil conflict for political reasons is very easy." The African Union's peace and security commissioner, Ramtane Lamamra, said, "The Shabaab's attack was defeated. The situation is under control."

Addressing the U.N. Security Council, which was considering the possibility of replacing AMISOM with a U.N. mission, the U.N.'s chief political officer, B. Lynn Pascoe, argued that the "latest violence" in Mogadishu was a response to the T.F.G.'s "success in reaching out to opposition groups." Pascoe continued that the T.F.G. is supported by "large segments of the Somali people." Neither Pascoe nor Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon came out in favor of the immediate deployment of a U.N. force, saying that until security conditions improved and political progress advanced, AMISOM should not be replaced. The U.N.S.C. decided to follow their advice.

Responding to Ould Abdallah's criticism of him on May 14, Sh. Aweys told Reuters that the U.N. special representative "consistently defends the government's policies as if he is the president of this country and he is not playing his role of engaging every side of the conflict." Speaking to Agence France Presse, Sh. Aweys called on Sh. Sharif to resign the presidency, adding that "we have no real Somali government to speak of, but foreign puppets who call themselves the leaders of Somalia." In his first public statement for more than a year, al-Shabaab's titular leader, Sh. Mukhtar Abdirahman Godane, stated in a videotape that the T.F.G. could not "be described as an Islamic government, because it was created to destroy Islamists in Somalia." Godane explained that the T.F.G. includes former warlords from the coalition that the I.C.U. expelled from Mogadishu three years ago, and that after assuming the presidency, Sh. Sharif had sought advice and military support from external powers. On May 14, Sh. Sharif signed legislation instituting Shari'a in Somalia and promised to appoint a committee of experts to reconcile the T.F.G.'s clan-based secular constitution with Islamic law, a concession that was unlikely to assuage the armed opposition.

On the ground, international and local media reported a stand-off at the presidential palace between the armed opposition and AMISOM/T.F.G. forces. Fighting continued in the north and south of Mogadishu, as the armed opposition made further gains and sought to clean out T.F.G. positions in areas that had previously been spared from the conflict. Writing for the Afrik website, Kanya Obaje Ori reported that T.F.G. forces were defecting to the armed opposition, and that the latter now counted six thousand fighters in Mogadishu facing four thousand T.F.G. troops and the 4300 AMISOM forces. AMISOM was reported to have redeployed forces from bases in the city's north to a new base in the south in order to protect supply lines. The T.F.G. replaced its top military commander with senior police commander, Gen Yusuf Osman Dhuma, consolidating police control over the T.F.G.'s frail security forces.

Commenting on the situation, AMISOM spokesman Maj. Barigye Ba-Hoku said that "we do not see anything new in Mogadishu. The insurgents launch attacks and then cool down." Ba-Hoku added that reports of opposition advances on the presidential palace were "propaganda" aimed at demoralizing T.F.G. forces and frightening the population. The United States embassy in Kenya condemned attacks on the T.F.G., expressed concern about the presence of foreign fighters and commended Sh. Sharif for "the important progress the T.F.G. has made in the past several months."

On May 15, international and local media reported a lull in the fighting, with Xinhua's Abdurrahman Warsameh writing that "opposing forces are stationed in close proximity, seeing eyeball to eyeball," as businessmen, clerics and clan elders attempted to broker a ceasefire. Shabelle Media reported that there was no mediation, but that traffic had resumed in some districts that had been conflict zones. Associated Press correspondent Mohamed Olad Hassan reported that the T.F.G. remained in control only of the road connecting the presidential palace and the city's airport and some government buildings, including the palace, (all of them protected by AMISOM) and quoted T.F.G. spokesman Abdulkadir Damaareh, who admitted that the armed opposition had taken two T.F.G. facilities, including the football stadium, which served the T.F.G. as a weapons depot. The Somaaljecel website reported that the armed opposition was now present in every neighborhood, that it was receiving fresh reinforcements from the southern regions, and that the T.F.G. was receiving reinforcements from clan militias in the Middle Shabelle region, Sh. Sharif's home base. Somaaljecel confirmed the A.P. report, saying that T.F.G. forces backed by AMISOM were concentrated at the palace, the port, the airport, and the airport road. The BBC quoted H.I. chair Iman as saying that most pro-government forces had disbanded and that the rest were being protected by AMISOM.

The BBC reported an offer from Sh. Sharif to negotiate with the armed opposition and its rejection by Sh. Aweys, who remained firm in his demand that AMISOM withdraw before a new peace process involving "all stakeholders" would be possible. The T.F.G.'s minister for planning and international cooperation, Abdishakur Warsame, vowed that the T.F.G. would "clear the rebels from the country in the coming days." AMISOM spokesman Ba-Hoku told Voice of America's Peter Clottey that the peacekeepers would not be tempted to engage in warfare with the armed opposition: "We know their tactics, we are prepared for those tactics, and we are not ready to fall into their tactics of pulling us into the conflict." Ba-Hoku admitted that the T.F.G. had not "been able to consolidate its power and that is the advantage that the forces that oppose the peace process are taking."

The international actors supporting the T.F.G. ratcheted up their rhetorical attacks on the armed opposition, focusing on the presence of foreign fighters in their ranks. While repeating a pledge to try to remove opposition figures from U.N. and U.S. terrorist lists, if they joined the peace process, Ould Abdallah said that 280 to 300 foreign fighters had been involved in the wave of clashes, remarking that some were mercenaries and others Islamic ideologues. The A.U.'s special representative to Somalia, Nicholas Bwakira, was even more assertive, claiming that al-Shabaab was controlled by al-Qaeda and was "a group of war criminals." Bwakira set the tally of foreign fighters at 300 to 400 and said to Kenya's Daily Nation that "the African Union forces are tracking them down."

Ba-Hoku said that although AMISOM had not been able to confirm that the armed opposition was holding businessmen hostage and extorting money from them on pain of execution, "we would not have any doubt in our minds that it is possible." Also on May 15, the U.N. Security Council unanimously approved a non-binding "presidential statement" demanding that the armed opposition renounce violence and join the peace process, reserving special condemnation for al-Shabaab.

The I.C.C. ended a two-day meeting in Djibouti attended by clerics from outside Somalia that was devoted to the role that the I.C.C. could play in the peace process. I.C.C. spokesman Sh. Ahmed Abdi Dhisow told Shabelle Media that the causes of the failure of previous mediation efforts were not discussed.

Conclusion

The foregoing chronicle of the political/military events in Mogadishu from mid-April through mid-May has been written to provide evidentiary support for the thesis that the most probable future for southern and central Somalia is a period of "protracted fighting without a definitive outcome." The analytical component of the chronicle is mostly implicit; its description of the moves of the major domestic actors should speak for itself and lead to the conclusion that a cycle of civil conflict has taken root and has deepened, having entered a new stage. One can make what one will of Ould Abdallah's claim "that to perpetuate the idea that it is a civil conflict for political reasons is very easy." Indeed, it is "easy," but that is because it is obvious – we are not engaged in rocket science here.

The chronicle traces a trajectory from the initiation of an assertive policy by the T.F.G. and I.C.U. that led to a build-up of armed conflict; through a "wait-and-see" phase (as an editorial in Garoweonline termed it), marked by the return of Sh. Aweys to Mogadishu; to the surge of the armed opposition and its success in pushing back the T.F.G. and I.C.U. On the way, efforts at mediation by the I.C.C., T.U.C. and the militant faction of H.I. collapsed, generating the present condition of intensified polarization. Any expected gains for the T.F.G. from cooperation with Indha'ade's faction of H.I. dissolved when the latter was swept from the field.

That is not to say that the armed opposition has won the battle of Mogadishu; only that it can claim victory in the first round. AMISOM, with its tanks and other heavy weapons, remains in the city and might even be reinforced, if Burundi fulfills a pledge to send a new battalion and Sierra Leone honors its promise to provide a battalion. As long as AMISOM remains, the T.F.G. is unlikely to be routed altogether and will exist in protective custody with dwindling credibility, popular legitimacy and effectiveness. It will become ever more clear that the T.F.G. is a creature of external powers, which will fortify the position of the armed opposition. Ba-Hoku is correct that the armed opposition "launches attacks and then cools down," but that hardly means that there is nothing "new in Mogadishu." The new wrinkle is that the balance of power has changed and that the T.F.G. is no longer the protagonist in the conflict; it is simply one of the players and a weak and wasting "asset "of the Western powers and international organizations, whose pledges of financial support for the T.F.G. in April are now less likely to be fulfilled – why throw good money after bad? Even if the donors come through with their (U.S.)$213 million, two-thirds of which they apportioned to AMISOM and only one-third to train and equip the ten thousand envisioned T.F.G. forces, it is unlikely to come in time to bolster the T.F.G., especially in light of the donors' demands for "accountability mechanisms." It should also be mentioned that this chronicle does not consider the burgeoning civil conflict in the central Hiraan region where the I.C.U. administration faces challenges from al-Shabaab, the militant H.I., and warlord militias trained by Ethiopia, which has renewed its own incursions across the border; the central Galgadud region, where the dominant A.S.W.J. is contested by al-Shabaab; the deep southern Jubba regions, where tensions have surfaced within the dominant hardline Islamist coalition; and political opposition to the T.F.G. in Puntland. If the period from mid-April through mid-May does not spell a cycle of civil conflict, it strains the imagination to conceive of what would.

Report Drafted By:
Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science, Purdue University
weinstem@purdue.edu

Muslims "must" unite all over the World
and pray for the appearance of al Mahdi (r.a.) the Saviour of mankind
the descendent of Prophet Muhammed s.a.w.

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